Obligation, contracts, and negotiation: Outlining an approach  by Brown, Mark A.
Journal of Applied Logic 3 (2005) 371–395
www.elsevier.com/locate/jal
Obligation, contracts, and negotiation:
Outlining an approach
Mark A. Brown
Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210, USA
Available online 2 June 2005
Editors: A. Lomuscio and D. Nute
Abstract
In this paper I outline an ambitious project to incorporate into a normative language the tools nec-
essary for an account of hierarchical organizations and the changing roles and obligations of agents
within them, and an analogous account of contracts and the changing roles and obligations of agents
who are parties to contracts. While such an enriched language is likely to be considerably more
complex than those most often considered for deontic logic, it promises for that very reason to en-
large considerably the range of normative problems that can be accurately expressed and effectively
addressed.
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1. Background assumptions
Several working hypotheses, shaped over the course of my previous work in deontic
logic, form the background for my current investigations:
– deontic logic can best be treated as a logic of normative propositions, rather than as a
logic of truth-valueless norms;
– agents can, and often do, have conflicting obligations;
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– refraining is itself one kind of action;
– prohibitions are obligations to refrain;
– obligations are, at bottom, impersonal;
– action requires freedom to choose;
– genuine freedom to choose implies that choices affect the future;
– if the future is affected by choices, there are genuinely alternative futures.
All of these views are ones to which I have been led by the work of others,1 but these
beliefs have also been reinforced by the gradually unfolding inner dynamic of the subject
itself. Some of these points call for a bit of comment and explanation.
Obligations, I am supposing, normally call for action. We do not ordinarily impute
obligations to beings we do not view as agents. Nor do we ordinarily hold that an agent has
an obligation about which nothing (not even an exercise of restraint) should be done. As a
result, it is essential for any rich deontic logic to consider the nature and role of actions in
relation to obligations.
In spite of the fact that obligations commonly call upon agents to act in some way or
other, I suggest that obligations are, at bottom, impersonal. That is to say, we get our most
coherent account of personal obligation if we construe
agent α ought to see to it that p
as being of the underlying form
it ought to be that: agent α sees to it that p.
The argument, briefly, is this: we will certainly want a personally indexed action opera-
tor ∆α to make it possible to use in a formula ∆αp when we express the claim that agent
α brings it about that p. Without such personalized action formulas, we will be unable to
relate an individual’s actions to their responsibilities, as when, for example, we wish to
indicate that agent α is in fact doing what s/he ought to do. If, however, we take our basic
obligation operator to be personally indexed as well, say ∅α , and then wish to express
the claim that agent α has an obligation to see to it that p, we will find ourselves using a
doubly personalized expression such as ∅α∆αp. If this double indexing is not redundant,
then it ought to be possible to construct claims of the form ∅α∆βp, in which two distinct
agents α and β are involved. But it is doubtful, at best, that such an expression would be
meaningful. The alternative—that the double indexing is redundant—coupled with the ev-
ident need to have a personal index for the action operator, argues in favor of surrendering
the personal index on the normative operator.2
1 In particular, by the work of Belnap and his collaborators, and work by various of the other participants in the
∆EON workshops that have been held biennially since 1991, including [1,2,15,16,20–26].
2 Krogh and Herrestad [20] and Horty [18], among others, argue against this position. But the arguments in
Krogh & Herrestad assume that the deontic operator is a normal modal operator. I argue, in Brown [7], that a
semantically more complex deontic operator is required, to which these particular arguments then do not apply.
The argument in [18] is applied to a particular account of utilitarian “obligation”, different in kind from the sense
of contractual obligation that is the focus of attention here.
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atypical because they do not explicitly call for action, and do not identify any agent as the
locus of responsibility, nonetheless embody normative sentiments: there ought to be peace
among mankind, there should be no poverty, etc.
The chain of reflections which begins with the thought that action requires freedom to
choose, quickly leads to the hypothesis that we should take the notion of alternative futures
with some seriousness, and that we should therefore adopt a logic of branching time. Us-
ing a logic of branching time does not require that we be dogmatic realists about possible
futures, but it does call for us to consider making free use of the notion of possible futures,
at least as a means of explicating the folk metaphysics underlying our everyday modes of
thought about choice, action and responsibility—modes of thought which strongly influ-
ence our legal system, our organizations, and our interpersonal relations. We may at some
later point find ways in which to explain away any apparent reliance on alternative futures,
but until that day, I suggest, the notion of branching time, with alternative futures, should
be used freely in our analysis of the normative.
The payoff is enormous. The logic of branching time affords us the means to give plau-
sible connected accounts of action, of ability, and of event causation (e.g. in [3–5,18,19,
30]), all of which can play important roles in our normative theorizing. With such benefits
in prospect, then, I have embraced the logic of branching time as the basic framework for
my own work in deontic logic [6–11]. Accordingly, I need to give a brief outline of that
framework here, before continuing to the larger tasks ahead.
2. Branching time
In models based on branching time,3 we view time as composed of moments, partially
ordered into a tree of histories—i.e., of complete linear sequences (running from past to
future) of moments—with alternative histories branching off from one another at various
points. Among such branch points are those moments at which agents freely make choices,
since the facts of future history will depend on which choice the agent makes. Normally the
choice will make a palpable, even if only local, difference to the course of history. But even
when there is no palpable difference in outcome, it will at least be true in some histories,
but false in others, that the agent made, say, choice a rather than choice b.
I say “histories”, rather than “history”, because the agent’s choice cannot be expected
to fix some single history as the genuine and henceforth guaranteed future, but can only be
expected to confine the future to some group of histories, while excluding others. This is
because other agents (and even the same agent) will, in future, be making further choices,
3 The models described here are of one common sort, in which moments of time are taken as fundamental con-
stituents, and histories and branches are defined as certain sequences of moments. A second, technically distinct,
approach would take branches, or possible futures, as fundamental, and define moments as certain abstractions
from branches. Complete axiomatizations are known for this second approach (e.g., in [31] and [12]), but not
for the first. However, since there is little working difference between the two, and the moment-based approach
comes more naturally to most readers, I use it here. The discussion of branching time has a long history, with
[13,27–29] providing notable contributions.
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uations of the sequence of moments running back through this current one. As a result, we
model choices as choices among mutually exclusive sets of histories, as indicated in the
diagram below. (Here, as we all know, time flows from left to right.)
We permit forward branching. We reject backwards branching. The future is, we believe,
open, unsettled, with a multitude of possibilities. The past is, we believe, now settled,
single, and unchangeable. Looking forward we see no fully determinate future; various
future courses of history are still possible. Looking back, we see only one course of past
history up to this point.
One unexpected consequence of accepting this view of time is that within the branching
models, we cannot in general assign truth values to formulas at a moment. Instead, we
must assign propositions their truth values relative to a moment and a history through that
moment. This is because if I have at this very moment a genuine choice between, say,
options a and b, then it cannot be said to be true yet, that by tomorrow I will have selected
option‘a, nor yet that I will have selected option b. It will, however, be correct to say that
relative to (i.e., in) certain histories running through the present moment it is true right
now that by tomorrow I will have selected a, while relative to other histories through this
same moment, it is already true that by tomorrow I will have selected option b. This is
simply because some histories from this choice point onward are ones that issue from my
choosing a right now, while others issue from my choosing b. In short, this reflects the
openness of the future which is the seemingly essential accompaniment of genuine choice.
The basic frames we use in our semantics, then, contain a set M of moments, and a partial
ordering < which orders M into a tree that branches futurewards. Histories in the frame will
be complete sequences of moments linearly ordered by < (complete non-backtracking
paths from left to right, diagrammatically speaking). A model M will supplement such
a frame with a valuation V which assigns truth values to each atomic sentence at each
moment/history pair m/h such that moment m falls within history h. Such moment/history
pairs are thus the fundamental points of evaluation for formulas in our semantics. But
it becomes tedious and distracting to continually describe them in this cumbersome way
as pairs. Accordingly, I shall henceforth speak of a point e of evaluation, or simply of a
point e, where we might otherwise have to mention a moment/history pair m/h in which
the moment m falls within the history h.
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M= 〈M,<,V〉
M: set of moments <: partial ordering on M
V: valuation, assigning truth values at moment/history pairs
Within a semantics supplied with such resources, we can provide truth conditions for
operators expressing
• tenses: past, present, and future,
• duratives: since, while and until
and we can model
• propositions (as sets of points of evaluation),
• events,
• event causation.4
3. Agents and obligations in branching time
To bring agents and their choices into the picture, we need to make the frames, and
therefore the models, more elaborate. We must add a collection A of agents, and a choice
function C which, at each moment, for each agent, partitions the set of histories through
that moment into subcollections corresponding to the various choices open to that agent at
that moment.
MODELS FOR AGENTS IN BRANCHING TIME
M= 〈A,C,M,<,V〉
A: set of agents C: choice function
In this enriched setting, we can go on to model
• actions,
• consequences of actions,
• refraining,
• ability.
This territory has been explored, with great success, by Belnap and various collabora-
tors.
To bring a normative dimension into the picture, we can introduce a deontic function D
which indicates, for each point of evaluation, just which propositions are the contents of
obligations in force at that juncture in time. When the obligations in question are personal,
4 I won’t enter into details here. They can be found in [10,30].
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agent who has the obligation acts in accord with that obligation. Thus Olga’s obligation at
point e to pay Jan 10 euros will be represented by the fact that the set D(e) of propositions
which ought to become true includes, as one its elements, the proposition that Olga pays
Jan 10 euros.
MODELS FOR MORAL AGENTS IN BRANCHING TIME
M = 〈A,C,D,M,<,V〉
D: deontic function
This addition to our models will now make it possible to model:
• some kinds of obligations,
• logical consequences of fulfilling such obligations
and, making use of earlier techniques from the logic of action and of causation:
• acts of fulfilling obligations,
• acts of violating obligations,
• causal consequences of fulfilling obligations,
• causal conditions for the fulfillment of obligations.
I say some kinds of obligations. We may distinguish several types of obligations, and
the methodology sketched thus far is not able to deal equally well with all of them.
Some obligations are dischargeable: there is some appropriate action or event, the oc-
currence of which will fulfill, and thus completely discharge, that obligation. Promises and
loans provide simple examples of dischargeable obligations.
In some contrast to these, there are also standing obligations: ones which can perhaps be
repeatedly violated, but can never be completely fulfilled and thus nullified. My obligation
to honor my parents may be seen as falling in this category. No matter how much I do
today to render honor to my parents, tomorrow I will still continue under this obligation.
Among dischargeable obligations, we may recognize a subclass of obligations which
are cumulative: these are obligations which, under some circumstances, merge, like two
measures of water in a single vessel, rather than coexist, like two stones. If I borrow 10
euros from you today, and then (without repaying the first) borrow another 10 euros to-
morrow, then it is plausible to consider that I now have a single debt of 20 euros, rather
than two debts of 10 euros each. This shows up a bit more clearly when we note that if,
subsequently, I make partial repayment of 5 euros, there would be no clear fact of the mat-
ter about which of the two 10-euro loans was thereby partially discharged, and we would
report the resulting state of affairs by saying I still owe you 15 euros, rather than by saying
that I owe you 5 euros and another 10.
Simply dischargeable obligations are dischargeable obligations which are not cumu-
lative. These are the ones most successfully handled using the models for moral agents
described above. They are easy to model because for these obligations it suffices to keep a
simple “to do” list, giving all the simply dischargeable obligations currently in force, and
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made, then strike that item off the list when that promise is fulfilled, for example.
Such a list is easily5 updated, because the rules for updating are very simple:
• when any agent incurs a new
simply dischargeable obligation,
add to the list the proposition expressing
the precise conditions for that agent’s fulfilling that obligation;
• when those conditions are met,
i.e., when the proposition becomes true,
delete that proposition from the list;
and perhaps, if we accept the principle that ought implies can:
• when it becomes impossible to meet those conditions,
• delete that proposition from the list.
Other obligations, however, are not so easy to model. In the case of cumulative oblig-
ations, in particular, updating would seem to be a more complex process than just adding
items to the list when new obligations are incurred and later striking them off when they
are discharged. Instead, for example, we might have a course of events something like the
following:
t1: I borrow 10 euros from you. add: I pay you 10 euros
t2: I borrow another 10 euros from you. substitute: I pay you 20 euros
t3: I pay you 5 euros. substitute: I pay you 15 euros
t4: I pay you 10 euros. substitute: I pay you 5 euros
t5: I pay you 5 euros. delete: I pay you 5 euros
But how are we to know precisely what changes should be made in the list, and under
what circumstances? Or rather: How can our semantics specify, in general, just how the
list should be modified at a given moment? It is this question which has, for me, prompted
the line of investigation that forms the substance of this present paper. Or rather, it is the
following stray thought concerning a possible answer to this question: Perhaps we should
think of this loan as a contract, an agreement negotiated between us, that later gets rene-
gotiated. Then perhaps we could let the progress of negotiations give the conditions for
updating the list of obligations currently in force.
That’s the starting point, here, but introducing consideration of contracts and of nego-
tiation will release, as we shall see, a whole cascade of reflections and developments that
lead precipitously to a much more ambitious project.
5 The excellent analysis in [16] indicates that updating may not be quite as simple as I indicate here. This same
analysis, however, provides substantial help towards supplying the needed extra details.
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In any theoretical work, we necessarily simplify the picture in order to clarify aspects of
our problem. As I have worked in deontic logic, there are various suggestions from other
authors which, in this spirit, I have heretofore temporarily set aside. But it now seems time
to consider some of these more carefully. Having resisted these complicating considera-
tions for so long, I shall now go to the opposite extreme, and give considerable play to the
pent-up imagination in pursuing some of these topics.
One frequently made observation is that commands, which are certainly one way of
creating obligations, involve at least two agents, not just one:
– the commanding authority;
– the addressee who is commanded to act.
Indeed, this observation is extended to norms more generally, recognizing an issuing au-
thority and a norm-guided constituency. So we might contemplate the possibility that
• perhaps all obligations involve more than one agent.
Various authors6 have also suggested the importance of recognizing that agents act in a
variety of roles:
– father – daughter – ruler – citizen
– physician – patient – employer – employee
– president – advisor – officer – stockholder, etc.
Following that thought a bit further, we might contemplate the possibility that
• perhaps all actions are performed in a role,
• perhaps each of an agent’s obligations is associated with a role,
• indeed, perhaps each of an agent’s obligations arise from a role that agent fills,
• perhaps all conflicts in obligations arise from differences in roles,
• perhaps roles arise from relations among agents.
As we examine the notion of contracts between individuals, perhaps we should also be
prepared to consider contractual relations between individuals and organizations and even
among organizations. An agent can have a role relative to a contract, or a role within an
organization. Moreover organizations, too, can be said to have obligations, and to perform
actions, which is perhaps why the law commonly recognizes corporations as persons. With
such thoughts in mind, various authors7 have suggested that
• perhaps we should consider corporations and other organizations as (abstract) agents.
6 E.g., [23,25].
7 Cf. [14,25], for example.
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• perhaps we can view an organization as a system of relations among agents
– thus creating roles,
– with associated obligations and powers.
But analogous thoughts seem appropriate to our thinking about contracts:
• perhaps we can view contracts, in general, as systems of relations among agents
– thus creating roles,
– with associated obligations and powers.
With this analogy in mind, then, perhaps we can allow ourselves one simplifying as-
sumption, at least for the nonce:
• perhaps (for now) we can treat contracts and organizations analogously.
The one difference we might recognize between a contract and an organization is that
we will not normally wish to think of a contract as itself an agent, performing actions and
having responsibilities. We will, however, wish to consider a contract as having an identity,
and that identity can conveniently be represented by a semantic constant like the sort of
semantic constant that identifies an organization, even if we do not attach responsibilities
and actions to that constant.
5. The emerging big picture to be explored
Putting all these thoughts together, we contemplate a rather ambitious theory that ex-
pands to include the following ingredients:
• obligations arise from roles,
• roles arise from relations among agents,
• these relations are constituted within contracts,
• organizations are in many important respects like contracts,
• organizations are themselves (abstract) agents,
• all actions are actions within a role,
• roles also carry responsibilities and powers.
Some observations about these points are in order here.
First, it is noteworthy that contracts can take various forms in various settings. Between
individuals, a handshake agreement can be considered an informal contract. A club has
its bylaws; a corporation has its articles of incorporation and its policies; a nation has its
constitution and its legislation.
Second, whatever the form of the contract, it can normally be renegotiated. Laws, and
even constitutions, can be passed, amended, rescinded; bylaws can be amended; corpora-
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from a promise, or accept an alternative means of fulfillment. And so on.
Third, the set of agents involved in a contract or an organization may change over time.
We will consider a corporation to have preserved its identity even though its work force
may change continually, with layoffs, new hires, retirements, etc. Its identity can persist
through changes in name, changes in policy, and changes in contractual relations to various
other agents.
Yet contracts and organizations themselves tend to come and go, and not merely to
change. Corporations are created at some specific time, and are disbanded at some later
time. Contracts are drawn up, modified over time, and are completed or expire. In these
respects, contracts and organizations are like human agents, who are born, develop, change,
and eventually expire.8
6. Some problems to solve
Integrating all these thoughts into a coherent deontic logic is a rather ambitious project,
and sets a number of challenges for us. We need to find answers to such questions as
these:
• how are we to model organizations or contracts?
• how are we to model roles?
• how are we to model action in a role?
• how are we to model action by non-human agents?
• how are we to model changes in organizations:
– in their structure?
– in their constituents?
– in their contractual provisions?
As we contemplate the processes by which contracts are changed, we see that we need to
find answers to the following questions, as well:
• how are we to model agreement among agents?
• in particular, how do we model founding agreements, i.e., agreements that
– create organizations,
– initiate contracts?
• more generally, how are we to model joint action?
These are far from trivial challenges.
8 Perhaps there are some contracts which persist indefinitely—the social contract, perhaps, or God’s contract
with His people. If so, perhaps these can be expected to give rise to equally persistent obligations.
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The more we think about the nature of organizations, the more complex the picture
becomes. We have already taken note of the fact that agents, both human and abstract
agents, come into and pass out of being. This is something that has not been considered in
the models for moral agents in branching time described above. There, we assumed that
the set of agents was a fixed set A. Now, however, we shall instead take A to be a function
which, at each point of evaluation, gives the set of agents currently in existence. We will
no doubt wish to impose some constraints on A. In particular, we want the duration of an
agent’s existence to be a single uninterrupted interval of time, along each history. More
accurately, we will want it to be a connected subtree in branching time.
There are other complications, as well. Consider:
people serve on
committees which are part of the
legislature which is part of the
nation which is part of the
United Nations.
And each of these units is capable of acting, each has its obligations, each has its roles,
responsibilities, and powers in consequence of various contractual relations. In short, or-
ganizations are often hierarchically structured, or hierarchically related to one another, and
the resulting network of structural and normative relations among agents can be very com-
plex.
One aspect of this is that we will need to find a way to relate the actions of individual
human agents to the actions of the organizations in which they participate. Presumably the
actions of organizations are supervenient on those of the participating human agents, and
we must find ways to describe and explicate the connections involved. In similar fashion,
we will need to recognize the relations between the actions of one hierarchical subunit and
the actions of higher units of which they are a part, between committees and legislature,
between provinces and nation, etc.
More fundamental than that, however, is the need simply to be able to express the struc-
tural relation of lower to higher levels in a hierarchy, with human agents serving as the
founding level. Perhaps we can make this our starting point. With this in mind, therefore,
• in the syntax, we add:
◦ Hα to express α is human,
◦ Πβα to express α is a participant in β;
• in the semantics, we add:
◦ H a function which, at each point of evaluation e, gives
a distinguished subset of A(e);
this subset will be the set of human9 agents;
9 We could, if desired, reconceive the set H(e) as the set of personal agents, human and divine, and recognize
one (or more) distinguished divine elements of this set. This would bring with it some further complications. I
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to a subset of A(e) × (A(e) − H(e))
(a transitive, anti-symmetric, relation).
The function π will then keep track of which agential units (human or otherwise) are
constituents of which higher-level agential units, at each point of evaluation. We can then
define levels of agents:
level 0: human agents
level n + 1: agents which
– have at least one level n participant, and
– have no participants of level higher than n.
With this notion of levels in hand, we can formulate a principle which we will wish to
impose, namely that there should be no abstract agent which isn’t ultimately founded on
human participants. We merely require that π be such that at each point e, each agent
from A(e) belongs to some finite level.
As a next step, we can construe each organization to be represented by its own charac-
teristic top-level agent σ , which can be thought of (somewhat colorfully) as the abstract
“soul” of the corporation, the abstract agent to which we attribute any actions, obliga-
tions, and powers of the organization as such. While the roster of agents participating in
an organization may change over time, this abstract agent does not—so long as it remains
appropriate to say that this organization exists, its top-level agent (that is to say, it) re-
mains the same. In short, the agent σ which we take as the “soul” of a given organization
secures the identity of that organization through change. Similarly with contracts. To the
extent that we wish to consider that sometimes a contract has been renegotiated, rather
than that one contract has expired and another come into being, we will want to have an
identity for the continuing contract that is in some measure independent of its changing
provisions.
The general picture, then, will be this: Each organization, and each contract, in short
each abstract agent, will have its constitution, or bylaws, or collection of contractual provi-
sions. I shall adopt the term ‘bylaws’ for these, irrespective of whether we are speaking
of a contract, a club, a corporation or a nation. The bylaws for abstract agent σ will,
among other things, establish various kinds of properties of, and relations among, par-
ticipant agents, and relations between the parent agent σ and various of its agents. The
bylaws may specify that there shall be a president, and establish the procedures for se-
lecting one, for example. The clauses of the union contract may specify that the work
crew shall have a foreman, etc. The agreement reached when a personal loan is extended
will (perhaps tacitly) specify who is the lender and who the debtor. The relations among
agents established by the bylaws will in turn generate roles relative to the organization or
contract, the role of president (of σ ), or foreman (of σ ), or lender (under σ ), for exam-
ple.
will proceed as if all personal agents are human, and will not attempt to detail the modifications that might be
appropriate if we take the more complex view. I trust they could be worked out.
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that formula would express a fact about the organization in question. But the bylaws have a
normative character not shared by all facts about the organization: the bylaws do not merely
describe how things are, they specify how things are to be. Consequently the bylaws need
to be differentiated from other, more accidental, descriptions of the organization. Perhaps
the bylaws of the club specify that the club shall have a maximum membership of thirty. If
in fact the club then has exactly thirty members, the fact that it has at most thirty members
will have the status of a bylaw, but the fact that it has exactly thirty members will not. It
would be entirely in keeping with the bylaws for the club to have had twenty nine members,
but not for it to have had thirty one.
If we were dealing with a single organization, with an unchanging set of bylaws, it
would be natural to express the bylaws in a set of formulas and use that set as a theory, i.e.,
as a set of axioms, in accordance with which to investigate the deontic scene within that
organization. Axioms would then have a more central status than any temporary hypothe-
ses we might introduce, and this would confer something like a normative status to the
bylaws (and their consequences). But we are supposing there may be many organizations,
with complex hierarchical relations to one another, and with changing bylaws. Some more
comprehensive and more flexible approach must therefore be devised.
So the system must somehow give us the means to attach to each abstract agent σ , at
each point e, a set of formulas expressing the bylaws of σ at e. The formulas expressing
these bylaws will need to be constructed carefully. Some vocabulary used in the bylaws
will in effect be defined by its provisions, but other vocabulary used in the bylaws will
simply have a general meaning, not specific to the organization. For example, the Consti-
tution of the United States provides that the president must be not younger than 35 years
of age. The set of individuals 35 or older is one which we can specify independently of the
Constitution. From among the members of that set, the citizens of the United States may
choose their president. But it is not as though the set of presidents is specifiable indepen-
dently of the provisions of the Constitution, with the Constitution then providing that from
among the presidents we may select one to be designated as being at least 35 years of age.
Age is a purely non-normative property, not given its very meaning by the constitution,
whereas the property of being president is one which is given its very meaning by its place
in the Constitution.
To mark the difference between these two properties, we can treat age as the simple
property our first instincts said it was, but treat presidency as a relation between an indi-
vidual and the nation. So it is not sufficient—indeed it would be insufferably provincial—to
say that George Washington was the first president. To be accurate, we must say he was
the first president of the United States. This then preserves some commonality of meaning
for the term ‘president’ across the ages and across organizations, while recognizing the
uniqueness of meaning the term acquires in each distinct organizational setting in which it
is put to work.
A formally equivalent, but notationally and psychologically more convenient, approach
is to continue to consider presidency as a property, but view it as an indexed property,
indexed by the organization in question. Thus instead of having a two-place relation con-
stant P , with the formula Pwυ , say, construed as meaning that Washington is president
of the United States, we would have a one-place predicate indexed to the organization υ ,
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ington is president. By thus keeping, yet de-emphasizing, the role of the organization, I
suggest we can facilitate accurate expression and reasoning about organizations.
Moreover, this provides a convenient way to recognize the important distinction be-
tween the two types of vocabulary: general vocabulary like the vocabulary of age, and
organizational vocabulary like the vocabulary used in specifying offices, committees, etc.
The latter will, while the former will not, be indexed to an organization. The latter will,
while the former will presumably not, give rise to roles in the organization: the role of
president, the role of member of the finance committee, etc. Note that, in anticipation of
this notational strategy, we have already adopted the indexed notation Πσα for expressing
the claim that α is a participant in σ .
Note that the organizational indexing of predicates and relations makes it easy to do
justice to some otherwise slightly tricky situations. Human agent α might be the treasurer
of organization σ , in which β is also a member; simultaneously β might be treasurer of
organization τ , in which α is a member. It may then happen that as a member of σ,β owes
dues to α, while as a member of τ,α owes dues to β . It would not do justice to this situation
to say simply that each owes the other money.
And that brings us to the notion of roles. I have offered the thought that roles arise
from, or are associated with, positions in such structural properties and relations. Thus,
for each structural relation Rσx1 . . . xn and each i such that 1  i  n, there will be a
role λxi.Rσ x1 . . . xi . . . xn. In the special case of the indexed predicate Πσ , this gives the
role λx.Πσx of participant in σ . As a degenerate case, we will also want to have the
role λα.α for each human agent α, i.e., the role of acting in their own capacity, on their
own behalf. This will be important for distinguishing an agent’s actions as an officer of the
corporation from her actions as a private individual, for example, thus making it possible to
note that what would in all other respects be the same action might be illegal if performed
in one capacity, but legal if done in the other. The degenerate role may also be needed for
bootstrapping the creation of organizations. As a notational convenience, we can abbreviate
the role λα.α to just α.
Of course expressions such as ‘λxi.Rσ x1 . . . xi . . . xn’ would be awkward to use with
any frequency in our syntax. Accordingly it seems wise to provide for a distinctive set of
constants for roles.
It is tempting (I have been tempted) to suppose that we should distinguish two kinds
of facts which contribute to defining the state of an organization at a given moment, a
distinction roughly like the distinction between essence and accident, or perhaps the dis-
tinction between form and content. On the one hand, we have facts such as that there will
be an executive committee. This seems like an essentially structural feature of the orga-
nization, and one which will be specified in the bylaws. On the other hand, we have the
fact that Jones is a member of the executive committee. That doesn’t seem like a struc-
tural fact, and doesn’t seem essential to the nature of the organization; moreover it is not
the sort of fact that would be specified in any ordinary set of bylaws of an organization.
The former seems to have a normative character, helping to specify how the organization
must be, while the latter seems more descriptive, merely reporting a fact about how things
are.
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Or, to put it another way, I think probably any way we attempt to draw such a distinction
will prove to be merely arbitrary, and/or to have no useful consequences. Such a distinction
would not serve to differentiate permanent from temporary features of the organization,
for example, since even the bylaws are not permanent. Similarly, no particular bylaw is
essential. If we try to draw the distinction by suggesting that it is a distinction between
formulas which are general and ones which are particular, the fact that η is the executive
committee of organization σ seems like a structural fact, but involves only constants, not
quantifiers.
There will be distinctions we can draw, based on syntax alone. There is the distinction
between quantified and unquantified formulas, the distinction between formulas that do
and ones that do not use a normative operator, the distinction between formulas that do
and formulas that do not use organizationally indexed relation constants, etc. I suggest that
none of these corresponds very closely to our initial intuition about a distinction between
facts of structure and facts of content, but that as we examine these syntactic distinctions
(and ones like them) we gradually find the original intuition fading from view, and find
that these syntactic distinctions can jointly do all the work we need to do even though
none of them is plausibly described as a distinction between organizational form and con-
tent.
To sum up our situation thus far, it appears we need a lexicon which will provide
• variables, and perhaps constants, for agents,
• unindexed predicate and relation constants of each arity,
• agent-indexed predicate and relation constants of each arity,
• general variables, and perhaps constants, for
• variables and constants for roles,
• quantifiers and the usual truth-functional sentential connectives,
• appropriate operators from the logic of time,
• one or more appropriate deontic operators,
• one or more appropriate action operators
and, of course, we will need to have our semantics support this syntax.
However, on reflection, we find that the action operators previously contemplated need
to be refashioned in the light of the fact that we are now acknowledging the importance
of roles, both for distinguishing actions and for distinguishing responsibilities. Deontic
operators will require no such change because personal obligation is always obligation
for an agent to act, and personal obligation arising in a role will be obligation for that
agent to act in that role. Consequently the relativization to a role can all be relegated
to the action operators, and won’t have to be separately provided for the deontic opera-
tors.
Relativizing action operators to a role is no particular challenge syntactically. Instead of
using an action operator ∆α , we instead use ∆rα , where r is a role. Semantically, however,
the situation is a bit more complex. To see how we can handle this, we need to review a
standard treatment of comparatively simple action operators such as ∆α .
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One standard version of the logic of action, based in a theory of branching time, is due
to Horty, and builds on work by Belnap.10 As I indicated in Section 3, the idea is to add a
set of agents and a choice function into the frames for branching time, and to provide truth
conditions for action formulas using these tools. I did not explain in Section 3 just how that
was made to work. It is now time to look more closely at those details.
The choice function C takes as input:
– an agent α,
– a moment m
and returns as output:
– a partition of the set of all histories
passing through m.
Each cell of the partition represents one choice open to α at moment m. The truth condi-
tions for the basic action operator are then given as follows:
∆αP is true at point e = m/h iff:
(the positive condition: reliability)
h is a member of a cell c in C(α,m)
such that for each h′ ∈ c; P is true at m/h′
and (the negative condition: freedom)
there is at least one history h∗
such that P is false at m/h∗.
The positive condition assures that the agent’s choice issues in the truth of P no matter
which of the histories in that partition eventuates. The negative condition assures that this
outcome was genuinely dependent on the agent’s choice, and wasn’t merely the inescapable
result of earlier circumstances.
However, this account offers no indication of an agent’s role, and must therefore be
modified if we are to have an account of action adequate for our present purposes. I suggest
that the key here will be to get the choice function to be sensitive to roles. Accordingly, let
us now have the choice function C take as input:
10 Cf. [3–5,18,19]. Horty and Belnap speak of stit theory, where ‘stit’ is an acronym for ‘sees to it that’. They then
write simple action formulas in the form [α stit: P ]. I will instead use more compact formulas of the form ∆αP ,
with the delta intended to be reminiscent of the verb ‘do’. That shift is not intended to be particularly significant
(I don’t intend to appeal to some alleged difference between seeing to the truth of P and doing something with the
consequence that P ) except in being more compact and permitting some license to reconsider the exact semantic
underpinnings of the theory for our present setting, without attributing any modifications to Horty and Belnap.
Belnap offers various stit operators, with different truth conditions. The version I will present here is what Horty
has called the “deliberative stit”, or dstit operator.
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– a role r ,
– a moment m
and return as output:
– a partition of a subset of
the histories passing through m.
Each cell of the partition represents one choice open to α in role r at moment m. The
subset within which the partition is defined will normally be a proper subset of the set
of all histories through m, because normally it will be possible for an agent to choose
among roles in which to act. Only those outcomes which are chosen in the role r will be
sorted among the cells of the partition provided by C(α, r,m). With this emendation in our
understanding of the choice function C, we can go on to give truth conditions as follows:
∆rαP is true at point e = m/h iff:
(the positive condition: reliability)
h is a member of a cell c in C(α, r,m)
such that for each h′ ∈ c: P is true at m/h′;
and (the negative condition: freedom)
there is at least one history h∗
such that P is false at m/h∗.
In the negative condition, we might wonder whether it would be more appropriate to
require that the history h∗ fall within a different cell in C(α, r,m), rather than it just be
some history through m. I think not. It may be that, in a given situation, one has no effective
choice as to how to act within a particular role, but still has the choice whether to act in
that role at all or not. In such a case we would not want to deny that the agent’s choice was
sufficiently free to constitute a genuine action. As a possible special case,11 for example,
every history within any cell of C(α, r,m) will be one in which the agent acted in the
role r . So if P expressed the claim that α acted in the role r,P would be true along every
history h′ within C(α, r,m), yet would genuinely be a consequence of the agent’s having
acted as she did.
11 This example is somewhat dubious, precisely because of the content of P . This example suggests the anal-
ogous case in classical stit theory of applying the action operator to a proposition expressing the claim that α
is acting freely. The result would be paradoxical, suggesting that some propositions P are pathological, or in
some other way ill-formed, and therefore inadmissible inside the scope of action operators of this sort. Whatever
principles might be devised to rule out that pathological case might also rule out my example in the text above.
Until someone can formulate and defend such principles, it is difficult to be sure.
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The creation and the amendment of contracts require the actions of more than one agent.
So do the creation, operation, and alteration of organizations. Moreover, abstract agents are,
we are supposing, capable of corporate action. Consequently, our logic of action must go
beyond merely providing an account of action, in a role, by an individual agent. We must
be prepared to account for joint actions of certain sorts, and we need to do so in a manner
that indicates the way in which such joint action supervenes on the individual actions of
human agents.
Moreover, there are some individual actions which can make special contributions to
the corporate situation, and which must be given special attention. In particular, consider
what occurs when a new piece of legislation comes up for consideration. Some human
agent or agents propose the legislation for consideration. If properly done, this already
gives the proposal a special status in the organization, but does not make it a law. Then a
vote is taken. But the vote consists of a set of individual ballot-casting actions, not entirely
simultaneous, and occurring in no particular order. Eventually, that vote has an outcome,
but not one which is attributable to the action of any one agent—neither an agent designated
in advance nor any agent discoverable after the fact. Yet it occurs, and occurs because of
the actions of the voting membership.
Not only must we be able to describe such processes, we must also be able to prescribe
them (or the manner in which they proceed) in the bylaws of the organization. Accordingly,
we need to be able to take account of some important kinds of speech acts, including
proposing that one clause replace another in the bylaws or in a contract, accepting such a
proposal (voting yes), and rejecting such a proposal (voting no). These are special kinds of
actions, so we would initially expect them to be expressed using our action operator ∆rα .
But for that to work for expressing proposals, for example, we would need to be able to find
some action-free formula P ∗ such that ∆rαP ∗ will express the claim that agent α, acting
in role r , proposes that P1 replace P2 in the bylaws of the organization σ within which
r is a role. But any formula P ∗ adequate to this purpose will have to be compounded
somehow out of formulas P1 and P2, if we are to be able to use this action formula as an
aid in tracking changes in the bylaws. Clearly no truth-functional compound of these two
components will serve. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any sentence of natural language
which would serve his role. How are we to complete the sentence
• Agent α, acting in role r (of the organization σ ) sees to it that . . .
in such a way that it has the effect of saying that
• Agent α, acting in role r (of the organization σ ) proposes that P1 replace P2 in the
bylaws of σ .
Every way I attempt to complete the partial sentence above, it either comes out using
an embedded clause which speaks of α′s proposing something, or mentions, rather than
incorporates, the formulas P1 and P2. But if we knew how to get P ∗ itself to express the
claim that α makes the proposal, we wouldn’t need ∆rαP ∗. And if P ∗ mentions, rather
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the propositions in question from their names instead of, as usual, from their sentential
expressions.
If we do not wish to introduce names for propositions (or for formulas) yet want to relate
an agent to a proposition, our only recourse, really, is to use an agent-indexed propositional
operator. Ultimately, it appears that we must set aside our understandable desire to use a
single action operator for all actions, and recognize that some actions are special in a way
that calls for special action operators. Specifically, for proposals, we seem to need a dyadic
operator P rα(P1/P2). We can make such an operator do additional duty by agreeing that a
formula of the form P rα(P/) can be used to register proposals that something be added
to the bylaws or to the contract, and that formulas of the form P rα(/P ) can be used to
register proposals that something be deleted.
Semantically, we will need to support this operator in some way that allows us to keep
track of currently pending proposals for change. The most straight-forward way seems to
be to add to the frame a function P which will take as input:
– the non-human agent σ(r)
(the one to which role r is indexed),
– a point e
and return as output:
– a set of pairs 〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 of propositions
(the set of currently pending proposals
for amending σ ′s bylaws).
We can then offer truth conditions for our new operator as follows:
P rα(P1/P2) is true at point e = m/h
iff
for some cell c ∈ C(α, r,m),
for each h′ ∈ c
〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 ∈ P(σ (r),m/h′) and
for some h∗
〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 /∈ P(σ (r),m/h∗).
We will also need new action operators Y rα(P1/P2) and N rα(P1/P2) for actions of
assent and dissent. The first of these asserts that α assents to the replacement, and the
second asserts that α dissents from such a replacement. For these operators, too, we will
need tracking functions in the semantics. We will need a function Y which takes as input:
– agent σ(r) (the corporation),
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– moment/history point e
and returns as output:
– a subset of P(σ (r),e)
(the subset of proposals approved by α).
This will allow us to state truth conditions for Y rα as follows:
Y rα(P1/P2) is true at point e = m/h
iff
for some cell c ∈ C(α, r,m),
for each h′ ∈ c
〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 ∈ Y(σ (r),m/h′) and
for some h∗
〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 /∈ Y(σ (r),m/h∗).
Similarly for the dissent operator. We will need a function N which takes as input:
– agent σ(r) (the corporation),
– agent α (any participant in σ ),
– moment/history point e
and returns as output:
– a subset of P(σ (r),e)
(the subset of proposals disapproved by α).
This will allow us to state truth conditions for N rα as follows:
N rα(P1/P2) is true at point e = m/h
iff
for some cell c ∈ C(α, r,m),
for each h′ ∈ c
〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 ∈ N(σ (r),m/h′) and
for some h∗
〈‖P1‖,‖P2‖〉 /∈ N(σ (r),m/h∗).
At this juncture, we have made our models significantly more complex, but correspond-
ingly more powerful:
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IN BRANCHING TIME
M= 〈A,H,π,C,D,P,Y,N,M,<,V〉
H: the class of human agents π : the participation function
P: the proposal function
Y: the assent function N: the dissent function
Having been drawn into providing special vocabulary for special cases of actions that
might arise in a group setting, we must wonder whether we have spawned a monster, a sys-
tem with an insatiable appetite for additional special vocabulary (and special functions in
its semantics). In particular we might wonder whether various kinds of group actions, group
responsibilities, corporate powers, etc. might call for equally special treatment. I think this
is a needless worry. I believe we now have the vocabulary needed to define the relevant
sorts of corporate actions and responsibilities as complex facts about organizational by-
laws and the actions of the organization’s participants. I confess, however, that this is still
at the stage of confident anticipation rather than one of satisfied realization.
We might also be concerned that we need a general account of joint action, one that
will enable us to give truth conditions for formulas expressing such claims as that Tom,
Dick and Harry carried the piano up the steps. No doubt the world needs such an account,
and no doubt that is an extraordinarily challenging project, but I think our analysis of
organizational action will not require so general an accomplishment.
10. A simple test case
Agent α, acting on her own behalf, proposes to borrow 10 euros from agent β , to be
repaid on Wednesday.
P αα(A&B&C/)
where A is an abbreviation for the conjunction of the more descriptive structural clauses
of the proposal:
πκα α shall be a participant in (contract) κ.
&πκβ β, too.
&Bκαβ Under κ,α borrows from β
and B is an abbreviation for the normative clause:
©∆lβT e10βαn As lender under κ,β ought to
transfer 10 euros from β to α now
and C is an abbreviation for the conditionally normative clause:
& (∆lβT e10βαn → ©∆bαT e10αβw)
If β, as lender under κ,
transfers 10 euros from β to α now,
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ought to transfer 10 euros
from α to β on Wednesday.
Here I have introduced abbreviatory constants for the relevant roles: b = λx.Bκxy (bor-
rower, under κ) and l = λy.Bκxy (lender, under κ).
We assume, for the purposes of the example, that the agential constant κ is not already
in use. Otherwise this becomes a proposal to amend an existing contract or organization,
rather than a proposal to create a new one.
Now, suppose both parties assent to this proposal. We now have:
Y αα(A&B &C/)
Y ββ(A&B &C/).
In this case, the contract goes into effect, i.e., its constitutive clauses A,B and C become
true. As a result, the agents involved have taken on various obligations:
©∆lβT e10βαn
∆lβT e10βαn → ©∆bαT e10αβw.
Suppose that, in fact, the lender β fulfills her part of the contract by transferring 10 euros
to α immediately:
∆lβT e10βαn.
At that point, the lender’s obligation under κ is fulfilled, ceases to be part of contract κ ,
and indeed ceases to exist. But the borrower’s obligation now becomes unconditional:
(C′) ©∆bαT e10αβw.
At this juncture, the contract κ effectively consists of the clauses A&C′.
On Tuesday, without yet having repaid the initial loan, α requests the loan of an addi-
tional 10 euros:
P αα(C∗/C′)
where C∗ is an abbreviation for
©∆lβT e10βαn As lender under κ,β ought to
pass 10 euros from β to α now
&(∆lβT e10βαn → ©∆bαT e20αβw) If β, as lender under κ,
pass 10 euros from β to α now,
then α, as borrower under κ,
ought to pass 20 euros
from α to β on Wednesday.
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Y αα(C∗/C′)
Y ββ(C∗/C′).
At this point, C′ becomes false, C∗ becomes true, and the contract in force is the renegoti-
ated one described by A&C∗.
Further modifications will be handled similarly.
11. Summing up
We appear to have made a promising start towards an adequate set of tools to describe
the negotiation and renegotiation of contracts. Moreover, I believe we have done so in a
way that will make it equally possible to discuss the dynamics of the normative situations
of hierarchical organizations.
But this is still only a sketch, and much work remains to be done. We must flesh this out
with “corroborative detail, to lend verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing
narrative”.12 Among the tasks that remain are these:
• We need to formulate general rules of inference which will produce the appropriate
changes in truth values of formulas as contractual situations change—rules which will
relate premises about proposals, assent and dissent to conclusions about what contractual
provisions currently hold, for example.
• We must explore the nature of contractual provisions governing the revision of con-
tracts, bylaws specifying the conditions for amending bylaws, etc. These are likely to
require rather complex formulation, perhaps with nested deontic operators, and their in-
vestigation may therefore unearth unsuspected problems.
• We will need to give close attention to quantification. There are notorious difficulties
in combining quantification with the use of modal operators, and care will no doubt be
required if such problems are to be solved or avoided in the present setting.
• We need to make good on the prospect of indicating how organizational action can be
defined in terms of individual actions of participants.
• We still need an account of rights, powers, permission, fraud13 and other similarly
central normative concepts.
Balanced against this daunting list of uncompleted tasks, we have the enticing prospect
of a number of benefits. Among the benefits we hope for are these:
• A full account of the dynamics of normativity.
• A basis for an account of the role of higher levels
(e.g., society as a whole, or nations)
in the creation and functioning of lower levels of organization
(e.g., governments, corporations, contracts, promises, etc.).
12 To quote Pooh-Bah, in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Mikado.
13 Cf. [15].
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– their sources,
– their optimal resolution, in some cases.
• An emergent account of normative positions.14
• An emergent account of Hohfeldian relations.15
• A foundation for an account of normative corporate concepts: duty, power, authority,
influence, responsibility, delegation, trust, fraud.
In short, the challenges are daunting indeed, but the benefits in prospect make it fully
worth while to undertake the attempt.
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